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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
LifeUSA appeals the January 13, 2000 order (filed 
January 19, 2000) of the District Court which certified a 
class of plaintiffs who had purchased LifeUSA 
"Accumulator" annuity policies between August 1, 1989 to 
the present. In its order certifying a class, the District 
Court focused entirely on the alleged pr e-sale 
misrepresentations of LifeUSA agents in the marketing, 
advertising, and sales of the Accumulator, stating ". . . that 
the gravamen of plaintiffs' claims is that Defendant's sales 
techniques and advertising constituted an allegedly 
fraudulent scheme." (A-16). The District Court's focus was 
not on the alleged post-sale misr epresentations contained in 
quarterly statements issued to purchasers of the 
Accumulator. 
 
This emphasis on the pre-sale marketing of the 
Accumulator is not surprising, considering the allegations 
of the plaintiffs' Complaint. However, on appeal for the first 
time, we learned that the plaintiffs' claims were not and are 
not based upon the sales presentations made by each of 
LifeUSA's agents. Rather, the plaintif fs have since shifted 
their emphasis from pre-sale fraud and misconduct in 
connection with the sale and marketing of the annuities, to 
post-sale fraud and misconduct: "The gravamen of this case 
is the nondisclosure of the real inter est rate in every 
uniform annuity and identical quarterly statement." 
Appellees' Br., at 20. 
 
Because the plaintiffs have alleged no br each of contract 
claim in their Complaint and because their claims ar e no 
longer based on the sales presentations -- the predicate of 
the District Court's class certification -- but are rather 
centered on the interest rates reported in post-sale 
quarterly statements and because the requir ements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) have not been 
met, we will vacate the District Court's class certification, 
which resulted from facts, allegations, and a theory 
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differing materially from the facts, allegations, and theory 
presented to us on appeal. 
 
We will, however, remand to the District Court to give 
that Court an opportunity to consider, together with the 
other issues identified in its summary judgment opinion,1 if 
the present interest rate and real interest theory of the 
plaintiffs as explicated in their briefs on appeal and at oral 
argument warrant relief and if so, class certification. On 
remand, if a class meets class certification standards and 
is then certified, the District Court must also ascertain 
whether it may exercise jurisdiction over all class plaintiffs 
consistent with this Court's ruling in Meritcar e, Inc. v. St. 
Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999), and 
whether jurisdiction pursuant to the Employee Retir ement 
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 1001- 




Plaintiffs/appellees represent a class of persons 
who purchased "Accumulator" annuities fr om 
defendant/appellant LifeUSA Holding, Inc. ("LifeUSA"). The 
Accumulator is a two-tiered deferred annuity contract,2 
whereby upon the deposit of the purchaser's premiums, a 
one-time bonus is paid on the amount deposited and 
interest is then credited to that incr eased amount. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Benevento v. LifeUSA Holding, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407 (E.D. Pa. 
1999). The District Court's denial of summary judgment does not bear 
on Rule 23 class certification. It does not implicate Rule 23(a) 
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation, nor the predominance and superiority requirements of 
Rule 23(b)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3), and see note 11, infra. 
 
2. An annuity is a savings instrument which accumulates sufficient 
funds to pay a fixed income to the annuitant for a definite period of time 
or for the annuitant's lifetime. It receives interest on a tax-deferred 
basis. 
A two-tiered annuity has two fund balances and two different credited 
interest rates. A higher interest rate is credited on accumulated sums 
used to purchase an annuity payout option, with a lower rate credited 
on funds payable upon lump sum surrender of the contract. 
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The Contract Provisions 
 
The Accumulator is a two-tiered annuity because it 
contains both an "Annuitization Value" and a "Cash Value." 
The Annuitization Value is the amount paid to the owner if 
the funds deposited are held under the contract for at least 
one year and annuitized over at least five years. The 
contract provides that the owner "will r eceive the 
Annuitization Value if the policy has been in force for at 
least one year and the proceeds are paid in a settlement 
extending over at least five years." (A-510). The 
Annuitization Value consists of premiums, bonuses credited 
to such premiums, and accumulated inter est. The contract 
guarantees that the "minimum interest rate credited to the 
Annuitization Value is 4%," (id.), but provided that LifeUSA 
"may declare a higher interest rate than the guaranteed 
rate." (Id.). 
 
The Cash Value of the contract is the amount the 
contract owner receives in the event that he or she elects a 
full or partial lump sum surrender. The Cash Value reflects 
a front-end load, no bonus, and, if the contract has been in 
deferral for less than ten years, a credited interest rate 
lower than that used to calculate the Annuitization Value. 
The contract explains: 
 
       Cash Value -- Cash Value premium payment are equal 
       to 80% of the first year premium payment and 90% of 
       the premium payment in years two throughfive. Cash 
       Value premium payments after year five are equal to 
       100% of the payment made. 
 
       Premium paid during the first five policy years in 
       excess of the planned annual premium will be cr edited 
       to the Cash Value in an amount equal to 95% of the 
       excess amount paid. After the first five policy years, 
       any excess premium will be credited to the Cash Value 
       in an amount equal to 105% of the excess amount 
       paid. 
 
       The guaranteed minimum interest rate cr edited to the 
       Cash Value is 4%. We may declar e a higher interest 
       rate than the guaranteed rate. The rate in ef fect for the 
       Cash Value on the policy date is guaranteed for the 
       first policy year. After the first policy anniversary, we 
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       may change the declared rate at our option. The rate 
       declared will never be lower than the guaranteed 
       minimum interest rate. 
 
       The interest rate credited to the Cash V alue will be 
       equal to the rate credited to the Annuitization Value 




The contract further provides that "Policy values before 
the Annuity Date are based on 4% interest compounded 
annually." (Id.). All Accumulator contracts contained a 20- 
day "free look" period providing the prospective purchaser 
the opportunity to review the contract and r eturn it within 
20 days if not satisfied.3 Significantly, the Complaint filed 
by the plaintiffs does not contain any claims that LifeUSA 
has breached any of the contract provisions. Moreover, in 
depositions, the named plaintiffs testified that they either 
failed to read or merely glanced at the contracts after they 
had received them. 
 
LifeUSA's Marketing of the Accumulator 
 
LifeUSA sold the Accumulator through 30,271 
independent agents. Indeed, the record discloses that a 
number of Accumulator purchasers were themselves 
independent agents who sold annuities. Agents wer e not all 
trained by LifeUSA. Agents learned about the Accumulator 
from (1) written materials describing the pr oduct, (2) the 
contract itself, and (3) from voluntary seminars sponsored 
by LifeUSA and independent Field Marketing Or ganizations 
("FMOs"). Marketing materials sent by LifeUSA to agents 
were not uniform. Decl. Of Charles Kavitsky P 17, (A-2588) 
("While some of the product information LifeUSA created 
was mailed to all LifeUSA or Allianz agents and FMOs, 
other items were distributed only to agents and FMOs 
licensed in a particular state."). 
 
Agents also employed marketing materials generated by 
FMOs, not LifeUSA. Agents were permitted to use their own 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Florida law was amended to provide Florida residents, such as Plaintiff 
Rita Baskin, with a 30-day free look period. McKay Decl. P 42, (A-1198). 
 
                                6 
  
sales material, provided that the material was approved by 
LifeUSA, for the purpose of complying with state r egulation. 
Agents did not uniformly rely on the marketing materials in 
learning about LifeUSA's Accumulator. In fact, some 
discarded the materials entirely. Appr oximately 10-15% of 
LifeUSA's agents have attended the seminars, and the oral 
content of the seminars varies. 
 
The Accumulator was sold typically in face-to-face 
meetings between agents and clients. The District Court 
found that the Accumulator was not sold accor ding to 
uniform, scripted sales presentations . (A-22) ("the 
information provided to each of the plaintiffs by the 
individual sales agents who sold them their policies was not 
identical."). Agents used varying sales pr esentations that 
they developed themselves, based on the prospective 
purchaser's financial objectives and sophistication, and the 
agent's knowledge and experience. Agents did not employ 
LifeUSA's marketing materials uniformly. For example, 
some agents always used illustrations provided by LifeUSA, 
while other agents never used them. Four of the plaintiffs 
testified that they might have received literature from their 
agents before purchasing the Accumulator , but none of 
them relied on such literature and none could recall the 
substance of it. 
 
Plaintiffs' Class Allegations 
 
Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts claims of fraudulent 
nondisclosures and misrepresentations (Count II), negligent 
misrepresentation (Count III), breach of duty of good faith 
and fair dealing (Count IV), negligence (Count V), and 
unjust enrichment (Count VI). In Count I, plaintif fs seek 
injunctive relief. 
 
Although the plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that LifeUSA 
misrepresented the Accumulator annuities provisions and 
the post-sale quarterly statements fraudulently 
misrepresented the interest rates cr edited to the annuities, 
the District Court's class certification opinion was directed 
entirely to the pre-sale marketing and sales of the 
Accumulator. With respect to plaintiffs' allegations 
concerning pre-sale marketing and sales tactics, the 
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Complaint alleges that LifeUSA "induc[ed]" and "train[ed]" 
agents to misrepresent the terms of the Accumulator 
"through standardized and unifor m misrepresentations and 
nondisclosures" at point of sale. (Compl.PP 1(a), (b)). 
Plaintiffs charged that LifeUSA "conceal[ed] and fail[ed] to 
disclose the true terms of the LifeUSA Accumulator annuity 
from the purchasers, who are given no written materials 
from LifeUSA and provided with only an application and the 
uniform representations of LifeUSA agents based upon 
LifeUSA's standardized misrepresentations and material 
omissions taught to the agents." (Id.P 1(c)). They alleged 
that "LifeUSA marketed its Accumulator annuities through 
standardized and a uniform patter n and practice of 
deceptive misrepresentations and nondisclosures to 
agents." (Id. P 43. See also id. PP 44-47). 
 
Despite the alleged misrepresentations which plaintiffs 
claim induced them to purchase Accumulator annuities (a 
claim now apparently abandoned) the plaintif fs also 
charged that quarterly accounting statements r eceived after 
purchase of an Accumulator uniformly misr epresented the 
true interest rate credited to a pur chaser's account. In 
essence, the plaintiffs charged that". . . the interest rate is 
less than the interest rate misr epresented by LifeUSA in 
quarterly statements to LifeUSA annuity purchasers." 
(Compl. P 83(a)). 
 
The District Court granted plaintiffs' Rule 23 class 
certification motion, relying on LifeUSA's pre-sale activities, 
holding, as we have earlier noted, that "the gravamen of 
plaintiffs' claims is that Defendant's sales techniques and 
advertising constituted an allegedly fraudulent scheme."4 
(A-16). While conceding that it was presented with a "close 
case," (A-12), and that LifeUSA's argument"has some 
merit," (A-22), the District Court nonetheless ruled that the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) wer e satisfied. With 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although the plaintiffs claim that a paragraph of the District Court's 
class certification opinion refers to inter est rates, withdrawal of 
funds, 
penalties, and loads, thereby indicating that the District Court's 
attention was drawn to the post-sale activities and quarterly statements 
now stressed by the plaintiffs, a fair r eading of the District Court's 
January 13, 2000 opinion is that these allegations all pertain to the pre- 
sale sales presentations of the LifeUSA agents. 
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respect to the predominance requir ement of Rule 23(b)(3),5 
the District Court stated: 
 
       While [LifeUSA's] argument has some merit in that the 
       information provided to each of the plaintiffs by the 
       individual sales agents . . . was not identical, it 
       nevertheless appears that the source of the plaintiffs' 
       misinformation and/or confusion was the advertising, 
       sales and marketing literature which Life USA prepared 
       and disseminated to its clients and its agents either 
       directly or indirectly through its Field Marketing 
       Organizations ("FMOs"). 
 
(A-22) (emphasis added). The District Court emphasized 
that "the basis for plaintiffs' claims against Defendant is 
that they [the plaintiffs] and the agents who sold them [the 
plaintiffs] their policies were intentionally misled by 
Defendant's sales literature and advertising." (Id.). 
 
The District Court also ruled that the superiority 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was satisfied, with the 
following analysis: 
 
       In addition, in light of the fact that the potential class 
       in this matter could number over 280,000, we believe 
       that the class action device is superior to other 
       methods of adjudicating this dispute. Obviously, 
       joinder of all class members would be impracticable 
       and duplicative individual trials would impose an 
       inordinate burden on the litigants and the court. 
       Accordingly, we conclude that the prer equisites of Rule 
       23(b) are present in this case. 
 
(A-23) (citations and footnote omitted). Oddly enough, the 
District Court made no mention of the approximately 
30,000 independent agents who sold the policies to the 




5. Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure requires that 
after 
the conditions of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied, the District Court must 
determine that common questions predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that class representation is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication 
of the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The full text of Rule 23(a) 
and 
(b) is reprinted in the Appendix, attached to this opinion. 
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       All persons who purchased an Accumulator annuity 
       from Life USA between August 1, 1989 and the pr esent 
       and are not officers or directors of Life USA or 
       members of the immediate family of any officer or 
       director of Life USA or any entity in which Life USA has 
       a controlling interest or the heir , successor or assign of 
       any such excluded party. 
 




Plaintiffs filed this class action complaint against LifeUSA 
in the United States District Court for the Easter n District 
of Pennsylvania. The District Court's jurisdiction was 
premised on 28 U.S.C. S 1332, as this case is an action 
between citizens of different states wher ein the amount in 
controversy ostensibly exceeds $75,000, exclusive of 
interests and costs. (Compl. P 22). After extensive discovery, 
on September 29, 1999, the District Court denied LifeUSA's 
motion for summary judgment, and on January 13, 2000, 
granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. (A-3-24). 
LifeUSA moved before us to appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 5, 2000, 
this Court granted LifeUSA's motion. 
 
A threshold issue which came to our attention is whether 
the District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1332 over the class, as the plaintif fs alleged.6 
Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction wher e there is 
complete diversity among the parties, and the amount in 
controversy meets the jurisdictional minimum. Each 
member of a class action must independently meet the 
jurisdictional amount requirement in or der to establish 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because we were concerned about the District Court's jurisdiction, we 
required supplemental memoranda fr om the parties. We called attention 
to our Court's decision in Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 
166 
F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1999). The memoranda that we received referred 
not only to diversity but also to possible jurisdiction deriving from 
employee benefit plans governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1001 et seq. Our 
disposition remanding to the District Court will permit the parties to 
explore the existence of ERISA jurisdiction with the District Court on 
remand. 
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diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. Each member 
who fails to meet the jurisdictional amount must be 
dismissed from the case. Zahn v. Inter national Paper Co., 
414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that "[e]ach plaintiff in a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional 
amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed 
from the case."); Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 218. "Zahn does not 
require that an entire class action be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction over some of the class members. 
Rather, the court is required only to dismiss those class 
members whose claims appear to a `legal certainty' to be 
less than the jurisdictional amount." In r e School Asbestos 
Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1315 (3d Cir . 1990).7 
 
As a general rule, the jurisdictional amount is determined 
from the good faith allegations appearing on the face of the 
complaint. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 
U.S. 283, 288 (1938). A complaint will be deemed to satisfy 
the required amount in controversy unless the defendant 
can show to a legal certainty that the plaintif f cannot 
recover that amount. Id. at 289. The Complaint here alleges 
generally that the amount in controversy in this action 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In Meritcare, this Court ruled that the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1367, does not overrule Zahn and thus does not 
disturb its holding that every class plaintif f must meet the 
jurisdictional 
amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. S 1332. Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 222 
(holding that "Section 1367 . . . preserves the prohibition against 
aggregation outlined in Zahn v. Inter national Paper Co., and Clark v. 
Paul 
Gray, Inc., and thus maintains the traditional rules governing diversity 
of citizenship and the amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. S 1332."). 
See also Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000). In so 
holding, we explicitly rejected the decisions r elied upon here by 
plaintiffs: 
In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'd by equally 
divided court sub nom., Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000), 
and Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th 
Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has not r esolved this circuit split, 
affirming the Fifth Circuit by "an equally divided Court," with no 
opinion. 
Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000). However, an affirmance 
by an equally divided Supreme Court has no pr ecedential value. See 
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 304 (1996). Therefore, Meritcare 
remains the law of this Circuit: each member of a class action must 
independently meet the jurisdictional amount r equirement, and those 
that do not must be dismissed from the action. 
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exceeds $75,000. (Compl. PP 22, 23). The Complaint also 
alleges that the named plaintiffs pur chased Accumulator 
annuities in the amount of $10,000, (id.P 7) (plaintiff 
Krapf), $75,000, (id. PP 5, 9) (plaintiffs Benevento and 
Rosenblum), $1,000,000, (id. P 13) (plaintiff Maze), 
$110,364.44, (id. P 15) (plaintif f Baskin), and $123,332. (Id. 
P 11) (plaintiff Compaine). 
 
However, whereas the Complaint alleges that "Plaintiffs 
and all members of the Class sustained damages," (id. 
P 33), it does not allege that each class member suffered 
damages in the amount of $75,000. Our remand to the 
District Court will require that court, among other things, 
to ascertain whether all members of the putative class 
suffered injury in the amount of $75,000, or to limit any 
class that may be certified to individuals with r equisite 




We review a District Court's decision to certify a class 
action for an abuse of discretion. Holmes v. Pension Plan of 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 2000); In 
re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 
F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1998). W e may find an abuse of 
discretion "where the district court's decision rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of 
law or an improper application of law to fact." Prudential, 
148 F.3d at 299 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
A finding is "clearly erroneous when the r eviewing court on 
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United 
States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 440 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In this connection, we call the District Court's attention to Georgine 
v. 
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). In Georgine, we declined to 
reach the issue of jurisdiction because it"would not exist but for the 
[class action] certification." Georgine, 83 F.3d at 623. The Supreme Court 
held that "[t]he class certification issues are dispositive; because their 
resolution [there] is logically antecedent to the existence of any Article 
III 
issues, it is appropriate to reach themfirst." Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612 
(citing Georgine, 83 F.3d at 623). 
 




In order to be certified, a class must satisfy the four 
requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, 
and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). 
If these Rule 23(a) requirements ar e satisfied, the court 
must also find that the class is maintainable under Rule 
23(b)(1), (2), or (3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). See note 5, supra, 
and Appendix. Rule 23(b)(3) provides that common 
questions must predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and class repr esentation must be 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. The Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance inquiry tests whether the class is sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by repr esentation, and 
mandates that it is far more demanding than the Rule 
23(a)(2) commonality requirement. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
623-24. 
 
In this case, the District Court found that the Rule 23(a) 
requirements had been satisfied, and that the conditions of 
Rule 23(b)(3) were met. LifeUSA appeals only the District 
Court's conclusions with respect to Rule 23(b)(3). See 
Appellant's Br., at 4-5, 23-24. Thus we ar e not concerned 
on this appeal with the Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) subsections. 
 
To qualify for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), a class 
must meet two requirements beyond the Rule 23(a) 
prerequisites: 
 
       Common questions must predominate over any 
       questions affecting only individual members; and class 
       resolution must be superior to other available methods 
       for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
       controversy. . . . Rule 23(b)(3) includes a nonexhaustive 
       list of factors pertinent to a court's `close look' at the 
       predominance and superiority criteria. 
 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (emphasis added and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
       In adding "predominance" and "superiority" to the 
       qualification-for-certification list, the Advisory 
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       Committee sought to cover cases "in which a class 
       action would achieve economies of time, effort, and 
       expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to 
       persons similarly situated, without sacrificing 
       procedural fairness or bringing about other 
       undesirable results." 
 
Id. (citation omitted). The Rule 23(b)(3) r equirements protect 
the same interests in fairness and efficiency as the Rule 
23(a) requirements. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 
F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996), af f'd Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 
Having reprinted in full Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(a) and (b) in the attached appendix, we do not list all the 
factors here. Rather, in this case, wefind particular 
significance in the last recited factor of Rule 23(b)(3)(D) 
which stresses "the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of a class action." Fed. R. Civ. P . 
23(b)(3)(D). We also recognize that because the Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance requirement incorporates the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23(a) we must tr eat them together, 
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626, and as we have noted above, even 
if Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement is satisfied, 
predominance may not be, as it is mor e demanding. 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-24. 
 
Thus our focus is on testing whether the class certified 
by the District Court here meets all the r equirements of 
predominance (i.e., that common questions predominate 
over questions affecting only individual members) and that 
class treatment is a superior method of adjudication. 
Factored into those questions is the difficulty to be 






As noted, the District Court found that the plaintif fs 
satisfied all four of the Rule 23(a) requir ements including 
commonality (Rule 23(a)(2)). However, in light of the record, 
we find unconvincing the District Court's explanation that: 
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       While [LifeUSA's] argument has some merit in that the 
       information provided to each of the plaintiffs by the 
       individual sales agents who sold them their policies 
       was not identical, it nevertheless appears that the 
       source of the plaintiffs' misinfor mation and/or 
       confusion was the advertising, sales and marketing 
       literature which LifeUSA prepared and disseminated to 
       its clients and its agents either directly or indirectly 
       through its Field Marketing Organizations ("FMO's"). 
 
(A-22). Equally unpersuasive is the District Court's 
statement that "[w]hile there ar e unquestionably individual 
issues of fact in each case, we find that the pr edominant 
issues in each such case of necessity are whether or not 
the defendant intentionally misled and deceived the 
plaintiffs, through its product and sales information and 
the training provided to its agents." (A-22-23). 
 
The District Court also noted that the "pr edominance test 
has also been found to have been easily satisfied in cases 
involving a common scheme to defraud millions of life 
insurance policy holders," (A-21), relying on In re The 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig. , 148 F.3d 
283 (3d Cir. 1998). LifeUSA had argued that predominance 
was not established because the purported class members' 
claims arose from individual and non-standardized 
transactions involving non-uniform oral 
misrepresentations. (A-21-22). Because common questions 
(commonality) must be established before pr edominance 




We have held that class certification is inappropriate in 
mass tort claims (i.e., asbestos, Georgine , 83 F.3d 610, and 
tobacco, Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d 
Cir. 1998)) which present questions of individualized issues 
of liability. 
 
In Georgine, we vacated a district court's certification of 
a nationwide settlement class of people exposed to 
asbestos. There we recognized that mass torts involving a 
single accident may be amenable to class action tr eatment, 
but observed that "the individualized issues can become 
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overwhelming in actions involving long-term mass torts 
(i.e., those which do not arise out of a single accident)." 
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 628. W e continued: "Furthermore, the 
alleged tortfeasor's affirmative defenses (such as failure to 
follow directions, assumption of the risk, contributory 
negligence, and the statute of limitations) may depend on 
facts peculiar to each plaintiff's case." Id. (citation omitted). 
In addition, we held that the predominance r equirement 
was not satisfied in Georgine, id. at 618, because 
 
       Initially, each individual plaintiff's claim raises 
       radically different factual and legal issues from those of 
       other plaintiffs. These differences, when exponentially 
       magnified by choice of law considerations, eclipse any 
       common issues in this case. In such circumstances, 
       the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b) cannot be 
       met. 
 
Id.9 LifeUSA claims, and we are compelled to agree that on 
the record before us, in this case the plaintiffs' claims raise 
"different factual and legal issues fr om those of other 
plaintiffs." 
 
In Barnes, we affirmed the decertification of a 
conditionally-certified statewide class of cigar ette smokers 
who asserted state law claims against a cigar ette 
manufacturer. Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143. We stated: 
"Because of the individual issues involved in this case -- 
nicotine addiction, causation, the need for medical 
monitoring, contributory/comparative negligence and the 
statute of limitations -- we believe class tr eatment is 
inappropriate." Id. at 149 (footnote omitted). While we 
recognize that Amchem and Bar nes are multiple tort cases, 
the principles and reasoning in those cases ar e applicable 
here. 
 
Here the plaintiffs assert claims arising not out of one 
single event or misrepresentation, but claims allegedly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(b)(3) provide that "although 
having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment 
as a class action if there was material variation in the representations 
made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they 
were addressed." Fed. R. Civ. P . 23(b)(3), Advisory Committee Note. 
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made to over 280,000 purchasers by over 30,000 
independent agents where the District Court found that the 
sales presentations (hence the alleged misr epresentations) 
were neither uniform nor scripted. Indeed, the District 
Court, while acknowledging that the claims or defenses of 
the class must arise from the same event, pattern, or 
practice, or be on the same legal theory, never identified 
any uniform misrepresentation made to the plaintiffs nor 
did it detail any material fact which was not disclosed to 
class members, and which accordingly, could have misled 
them. Significantly, in its class certification opinion, the 
District Court, in discussing commonality in connection 
with Rule 23(a)(2), found this case to be a "close" one. (A- 
12). 
 
The District Court's principal reliance on In re The 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig. , 148 F.3d 
283 (3d Cir. 1998), in certifying the LifeUSA class was 
misplaced and unfortunate. In Prudential, we affirmed the 
certification of a settlement10  class action involving 
Prudential's allegedly deceptive sales practices af fecting 
over 8 million claimants nationwide. However , Prudential, 
unlike this case, involved uniform, scripted, and 
standardized sales presentations. The district court opinion 
in Prudential found that "the oral component of the 
fraudulent sales presentations did not vary appreciably 
among class members. Plaintiffs' allegations and the 
evidence presented to the Court demonstrate that 
throughout the country, Prudential agents uniformly misled 
class members with virtually identical oral 
misrepresentations." In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 514 (D. N.J. 1997) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
 
In Prudential, the agents were car eer agents who worked 
exclusively for Prudential. Id. They wer e not independent 
agents like the 30,271 agents who sold Accumulator 
annuities to the plaintiffs. Prudential's agents were 
uniformly trained and Prudential requir ed its agents to use 
the uniform sales materials which Prudential furnished. Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. A settlement class, as distinct from a class action to be tried, does 
not implicate trial management problems. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. 
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at 515. Moreover, audits and state r egulatory investigations 
of Prudential revealed that Prudential agents had indeed 
committed uniform, deceptive sales practices nationwide. 
Id. at 514. 
 
The facts here in the extensive evidentiary r ecord of this 
case (depositions, affidavits, declarations, and the like) 
contrast starkly with the facts found in Prudential. In this 
case, as we have earlier pointed out, the Accumulator was 
not sold according to standard, unifor m, scripted sales 
presentations. In fact, the District Court found that "the 
information provided to each of the plaintiffs by the 
individual sales agents . . . was not identical." (A-22). 
LifeUSA agents are independent agents, not"captive" 
agents, as were Prudential's agents. LifeUSA's agents learn 
about the Accumulator from written materials describing 
the product, from the contract itself and from voluntary 
seminars sponsored by LifeUSA, but only 10-15% of agents 
attend LifeUSA's seminars. Marketing materials sent to 
LifeUSA agents are not uniform and many utilized 
marketing materials generated by Field Marketing 
Organizations who are not affiliated with LifeUSA. 
 
Moreover, the selling agents did not employ LifeUSA's 
marketing materials uniformly. Some agents discarded the 
marketing materials entirely. Agents' sales pr esentations 
were individually tailored to each customer's financial 
objectives. Significantly, when the plaintif fs testified on 
deposition, they admitted that if they r eceived information 
from sales agents prior to purchase, they did not rely on it, 
nor could they recall its substance. Indeed, a number of the 
plaintiffs failed to read or merely glanced at the contracts, 
leading to the District Court's observation that"it was 
incumbent upon the plaintiffs to read these materials, 
particularly in light of the defendant's twenty-day 
examination and return policy." (A-17). 
 
Hence, the facts of this case differ markedly from those 
which were found in Prudential. Accor dingly, even if the 
District Court had not centered its attention on pre-sale 
LifeUSA marketing activities, as the plaintif fs now claim it 
should not have, the record is uncompr omising in revealing 
non-standardized and individualized sales "pitches" 
presented by independent and differ ent sales agents, all 
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subject to varying defenses and differing state laws, thus 
making certification of individualized issues inappropriate. 
Thus, the District Court's finding from the r ecord that 
LifeUSA "has engaged in standardized conduct," (A-13), 
affecting the class members cannot be sustained. 
 
Moreover, the District Court in denying summary 
judgment to LifeUSA identified at least four major factual 
and legal issues that had to be resolved.11 The District 
Court failed to consider how individualized choice of law 
analysis of the forty-eight different jurisdictions12 would 
impact on Rule 23's predominance requir ement, see 
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 627, as well as individual 
determinations of causation, adjudications of contract law, 
reliance, the fiduciary status of defendant, and LifeUSA's 
defenses of contributory/comparative negligence and 
limitations. 
 
If commonality in the pre-sale marketing context does not 
exist, then common questions cannot predominate over 
individual issues because as Georgine found, each 
individual plaintiff's claim raises radically differing factual 
and legal issues from those of other plaintif fs. This, too, is 
the case here. Accordingly, we cannot uphold the District 
Court's exercise of discretion in concluding from its 




11. See Benevento, 61 F.Supp.2d 407. The four issues were (1) the 
independence of LifeUSA's agents; (2) plaintif fs' justifiable reliance on 
defendant's alleged misrepresentations and non-disclosures; (3) whether 
plaintiff could recover under the economic loss doctrine under Florida 
and New Jersey law; and (4) whether plaintif fs were entitled to relief 
for 
breach of contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing under the laws 
of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Florida. Those issues which included 
differing and independent defenses available to LifeUSA and which 
require individualized choice of law analysis to each of the plaintiffs' 
claims, see Georgine, 83 F.3d at 627 (noting that where variations in 
state law exist, "the proliferation of disparate factual and legal issues 
is 
compounded exponentially."), all operate to discourage class treatment 
and therefore class certification. Her e, among other litigable matters, 
LifeUSA will be confronting differing aspects of causation, differing 
state 
laws, and different defenses. See Benevento, 61 F.Supp.2d 407. 
 
12. LifeUSA represents that the "Accumulator" has been approved for 
sale in 47 states and the District of Columbia. 
 






Having determined that the class certified by the District 
Court does not meet the "predominance" r equirement of 
Rule 23(b)(3), we need not dwell at length on the superiority 
requirement of the rule, inasmuch as failure to meet any of 
the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) pr ecludes 
certification of a class. See, e.g., W ilcox v. Commerce Bank 
of Kansas City, 474 F.2d 336, 345 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F .2d 697, 703 (7th 
Cir. 1993). 
 
It will be recalled that the District Court her e dealt with 
the "superiority" test in one cursory paragraph: 
 
       In addition, in light of the fact that the potential class 
       in this matter could number over 280,000, we believe 
       that the class action device is superior to other 
       methods of adjudicating this dispute. Obviously, 
       joinder of all class members would be impracticable 
       and duplicative individual trials would impose an 
       inordinate burden on the litigants and the court. 
       Accordingly, we conclude that the prer equisites of Rule 
       23(b) are present in this case. 
 
(A-23) (citations and footnote omitted). This discussion, of 
course, gives little indication as to how a trial of this 
controversy, if tried as a class action, could be efficiently 
and fairly managed, which is the polestar of Rule 23(b)(3). 
In Georgine which decertified a class action we concluded in 
discussing the superiority prong of Rule 23(b)(3) that 
 
       The proposed class action suffers serious problems in 
       both efficiency and fairness. In ter ms of efficiency, a 
       class of this magnitude and complexity could not be 
       tried. There are simply too many uncommon issues, 
       and the number of class members is surely too large. 
       Considered as a litigation class, then, the difficulties 
       likely to be encountered in the management of this 
       action are insurmountable. 
 
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 632-33. 
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In Georgine, admittedly, the size of the purported class 
was much larger than the class here. It ranged from 
250,000 to two million individuals. However, in the present 
case, LifeUSA has issued well over 280,000 annuities to the 
class members, and the individual agents who sold the 
policies numbered over 30,000. Moreover , as we discussed 
under the section of this opinion dealing with 
predominance, there are individualized issues that would 
require individual determinations of defenses, 
representations, state laws, and the like. 13 Without going 
into detail as to the management of how a trial which 
would require proofs of individual claims of the plaintiffs 
and proofs of varying defenses of the defendant could be 
conducted, it is sufficient for our purposes to r ecognize that 
attempting to adjudicate plaintiffs' various claims through 
a class trial would not only be inordinately time consuming 
and difficult, but it would impermissibly transgress upon 
the required standards of fair ness and efficiency. 
 
Thus having concluded that the requirement of 
predominance has not been met, and that the superiority 
and the management of the trial could not be fairly and 
efficiently conducted as a class action, we ar e obliged to 
hold that the District Court improperly exer cised its 
discretion in certifying a pre-sale class. Accordingly, we will 
vacate the January 13, 2000 order of the District Court 
which certified the plaintiff class in a pr e-sale context, and 
remand this case to the District Court with instructions to 
decertify the class.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Although plaintiffs' claims are r elatively modest and separate suits 
may be impracticable, cf. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 633, that factor by itself 
is insufficient to overcome the hurdles of predominance and superiority 
and efficient and fair management of a trial, which Rule 23(b) requires. 
The individual adjudications of causation, r eliance, LifeUSA's multiple 
defenses, and application of differing state laws would make trying the 
plaintiffs' claims in a class action a thor oughly unwieldy endeavor and 
in the terms of Georgine make it impossible to conclude that this class 
action is superior to alternative means of adjudication. 
14. LifeUSA and Amicus argue that segr egation of individual issues of 
fact from common issues would violate LifeUSA's Seventh Amendment 
right to have its claims adjudicated by a single jury. See Appellant's 
Br., 
at 46 n.35. Although this issue is of serious concer n, we have not 
addressed it because we have concluded that the putative class must be 
decertified because it fails the predominance, superiority, and 
management requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 
 




Even though we have concluded that the class 
certification decreed by the District Court cannot be upheld 
because it rested on the pre-sale marketing, advertising, 
and "sales pitches" of the Accumulator , we nevertheless are 
seriously troubled by the constant assertions made by the 
plaintiffs in their appellate briefs and their appellate 
arguments that LifeUSA misrepresented interest rates and 
amounts all of which apparently stem not fr om the pre-sale 
representations but from quarterly statements which could 
only come about subsequent to the purchase of the 
annuities by the plaintiffs. As a consequence, we asked at 
oral argument for post-argument memoranda which would 
expound upon the real interest rate and the amounts 
actually paid. 
 
Plaintiffs furnished us with exhibits detailing calculations 
which allegedly illustrate the actual interest rate credited 
assuming daily compounding of interest. Those 
computations purported to show that, assuming daily 
compounding, the amount of interest credited represented 
a lower interest rate than the rate stated on the quarterly 
statements. In response, LifeUSA argued that plaintiffs' 
calculations incorrectly assumed that LifeUSA r epresented, 
in quarterly statements, that it would engage in daily 
compounding of the declared current rate of interest. 
Instead, it argued, the contract, the quarterly statements, 
and the marketing literature circulated to agents 
demonstrate that contract values are calculated based on 
an annual compounding of the declared current rate.15 
 
We had anticipated that these submissions would clarify 
the issue of post-sale misrepresentations which was 
emphasized by the plaintiffs in their appellate briefs and 
oral argument. We did so because, among other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Additionally, LifeUSA asserts that, even if quarterly statements 
uniformly failed to disclose the actual inter est rate, individualized 
issues 
remain with respect to this theory of liability, precluding class 
certification. It states that multiple variants of the quarterly 
statements 
existed, and that individual determinations of reliance, on the agents' 
representations as well as on quarterly statements themselves, would be 
required in order to determine liability. 
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considerations, plaintiffs had not claimed and do not claim, 
any breach of contract in their Complaint. This is not 
surprising to us because the contract entered into by each 
of the named plaintiffs provides no mor e than a guaranteed 
4% interest rate and also provides for dif ferent features of 
payments as well as representing that interest would be 
compounded annually. Thus we found it difficult to 
understand the shift in the plaintiffs' emphasis and even 
more difficult to understand allegations of standard 
uniformity in LifeUSA's representations. 
 
However, we found that we could not r econcile the post- 
argument briefs nor could we determine whether in light of 
the arguments therein made, a class meeting the standards 
of Rules 23(a) and (b) could be certified. In any event, it is 
not our function to make these determinations, but we 
would be loath to disregard these allegations just because 
they had not been ruled upon by the District Court. It is 
true that we had anticipated that the post-ar gument 
submissions would be conclusive in establishing either 
plaintiffs' claims or LifeUSA's defenses. Unfortunately this 
was not to be, and because we are not factfinders, see 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982) 
("[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, 
rather than appellate courts"); Chalfant v. The Wilmington 
Inst., 574 F.2d 739, 749-750 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, 
J., dissenting), we now determine that the questions of 
alleged post-sale representations and standard uniformity 
as well as all requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) should be 
found in the first instance by the District Court just as the 
District Court should resolve those issues it identified in its 
summary judgment decision. We suggest that if the 
plaintiffs desire to seek class certification again based on 
these post-sale activities of LifeUSA rather than on the 
marketing of the policies, it is the District Court that 
should consider and act upon such submissions. 
 
It may be, however, that when the District Court takes 
evidence of the post-sale representations and activities of 
LifeUSA it may determine that there ar e no grounds for 
relief or that if the grounds for r elief exist, that they do not 
comply with the stringent requirements of Rules 23(a) and 
23(b) due to individualized claims and individualized 
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defenses, and the requirements of pr edominance, 
superiority, and the management of a fair and efficient trial. 
Accordingly, our direction to decertify the class which was 
based on pre-sale activities will not preclude consideration 
by the District Court of claims with respect to post-sale 




We have determined that the class certified by the 
District Court looking to pre-sale actions of LifeUSA was an 
abuse of the District Court's discretion because the record 
does not support the findings made which ar e required by 
Rules 23(a) and (b). Nor does the recor d support the 
District Court's conclusions leading to a certification of a 
pre-sale class. However, because of the consistent 
arguments of the plaintiffs which emphasize post-sale 
activities of LifeUSA and post-sale misr epresentations with 
respect to interest, we will remand to the District Court for 
consideration of those claims and if applied for by the 
plaintiffs for consideration as to whether those post-sale 
claims comply with Rules 23(a) and (b), all in accor dance 
with the foregoing opinion. 
 




Rule 23. Class Actions 
 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members 
of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on 
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numer ous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable, (2) there ar e questions of 
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses 
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class, and (4) the repr esentative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the inter ests of the class. 
 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be 
maintained as a class action if the prer equisites of 
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
 
       (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against 
       individual members of the class would create a risk of 
 
       (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with r espect 
       to individual members of the class which would 
       establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 
       party opposing the class, or 
 
       (B) adjudications with respect to individual members 
       of the class which would as a practical matter be 
       dispositive of the interests of the other members not 
       parties to the adjudications or substantially impair 
       or impede their ability to protect their inter ests; or 
 
       (2) the party opposing the class has acted or r efused to 
       act on grounds generally applicable to the class, 
       thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or 
       corresponding declaratory relief with r espect to the 
       class as a whole; or 
 
       (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
       common to the members of the class predominate over 
       any questions affecting only individual members, and 
       that a class action is superior to other available 
       methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
       controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings 
       include: (A) the interest of members of the class in 
       individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
       separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any 
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       litigation concerning the controversy alr eady 
       commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the 
       desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
       litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the 
       difficulties likely to be encountered in the management 
       of a class action. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b). 
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